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EVIDENCE
I. RES GESTAE EXCEPTION
In two cases in 1974, the South Carolina Supreme Court
dealt with the res gestae exception to the rule against hearsay. In
State v. Quillien,I the court permitted a police officer to report a
statement given to him by a rape victim at the hospital shortly
after the event. In State v. Maxey,2 the court refused to allow the
defendant's mother to testify concerning an exculpatory state-
ment he had made to her. The court ruled correctly on the facts
of these two cases, but failed to clarify the effect, if any, that a
statement's self-serving aspects would have on its admissibility.
Professor Wigmore has given this definition of the rule
against hearsay:
Under the name of the hearsay rule, then, will here be under-
stood that rule which prohibits the use of a person's assertion,
as equivalent to testimony to the fact asserted, unless the asser-
tor is brought to testify in court on the stand, where he may be
probed and cross-examined as to the grounds of his assertion
and of his qualifications to make it.
3
As a general rule, hearsay testimony at trial is excluded4 to insure
reliability when the credibility of the declarant cannot be tested;
several exceptions exist. Dean McCormick sets out the require-
ments for the well-established exception for spontaneous declara-
tions, under which an "excited utterance" made under the influ-
ence of a startling event may be admitted:
First, there must be some occurrence or event sufficiently star-
tling to render normal reflective thought processes of an ob-
server inoperative. Second, the statement of the declarant must
1. 263 S.C. 87, 207 S.E.2d 814 (1974).
2. 262 S.C. 504, 205 S.E.2d 841 (1974).
3. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364 (Chadbourn rev. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
WIGMORE]. See C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 246 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
MCCORMICK]; FED. R. Ev. 801(c).
4. See FED. R. Ev. 802.
5. Fourteen exceptions are listed at 5 WioMORE § 1426; 28 exceptions are set out in
FED. R. Ev. 803-04.
1
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have been a spontaneous reaction to the occurrence or event and
not the result of reflective thought.'
The exception is permitted because the excitement of the event
supposedly overcomes any reflective thinking by the declarant,
thus making the statement an accurate and reliable description
of the events observed.7
In Marshall v. Thomason,' the South Carolina Supreme
Court quoted approvingly the rule set out in State v. Long:'
To qualify under the res gestae exception to the rule excluding
hearsay testimony, a statement "must be substantially contem-
poraneous with the litigated transaction, and be the instinctive,
spontaneous utterances of the mind while under the active,
immediate influences of the transaction; the circumstances pre-
cluding the idea that the utterances are the result of reflection
or design to make false or self-serving declarations.""0
Professor Dreher declared that "when the excitement is gone, so
is the exception.""1 He also indicated the significance of the
Marshall case:
It is true that the Court had used similar language in the past
but this time they emphasized what they meant by reversing
because of the admission as res gestae of a statement made after
the exciting influences of the occurrence had subsided. 2
In State v. Quillien,3 the defendant was found guilty of rape
and received a 35-year sentence. He appealed the conviction on
several grounds, including the admission, over a timely but gen-
eral objection, of a police officer's testimony concerning a state-
ment made by the prosecuting witness. After first establishing
that the interview was made upon her arrival by ambulance at
6. McCoRMICK § 297. See 6 WIGMORE §§ 1745-64; FED. R. Ev. 803(2).
7. MCCORMICK § 297.
8. 241 S.C. 84, 127 S.E.2d 177 (1962).
9. 186 S.C. 439, 195 S.E. 624 (1938). This rule was first enunciated in State v.
McDaniels, 68 S.C. 304, 47 S.E. 384 (1904).
10. 241 S.C. at 89, 127 S.E.2d at 178-79.
11. J. DREHER, A GUIDE TO EVIDENCE LAW IN SOUTH CAROUNA 78 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as DREHER].
12. Id. at 78 n.18.
13. 263 S.C. 87, 207 S.E.2d 814 (1974).
[Vol. 27
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the hospital, and while she was still with the doctor, the officer
gave this account:
At the time she told me she had been picked up off of U.S. No.
1 by a colored subject she did not know at gunpoint. He had
taken her by an apartment and raped her. They were coming out
from behind there and a police car came in behind them and he
started running from the police and at this time they went out
the Charleston Highway and the police wrecked him.'4
On appeal, defendant objected 5 to this statement as inadmissible
hearsay and also as a constitutional violation of the right to con-
front one's accusers.'" The supreme court correctly indicated that
the trial judge did not err in allowing this statement as evidence.
While the record is unclear as to how much time had elapsed
between the event and her relation of it to the officer, the clear
indication from the fact of arrival by ambulance shortly after the
car accident must be that the witness remained in a state of
excitation. The supreme court upheld the admission of the state-
ment on this basis, and thus did not deal with the confrontation
issue. Although not mentioned in the opinion, the prosecuting
witness had made the same statement at the trial, and was cross-
examined at length by defendant's counsel. 7 This would appear
to dispose adequately of the constitutional objection.
In State v. Maxey,'8 the defendant was found guilty of mur-
der and was sentenced to life imprisonment. His appeal included
an allegation of error on the part of the trial judge in excluding
testimony by his mother regarding a statement made to her. Dur-
ing a fight, two persons were killed by shots fired by the defen-
dant who pleaded self-defense. After the incident, the defendant
apparently walked one mile to his house, where he made a state-
ment to his mother which the court characterized as self-
serving.'9 The supreme court relied primarily on the similar case
of State v. Murphy"0 to affirm Maxey's conviction. Mattie Mur-
phy, also a defendant in a homicide, was not permitted to intro-
duce testimony of a police officer to the effect that she had gone
14. Id. at 96-97, 207 S.E.2d at 819.
15. Brief for Appellant at 14-15.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
17. Record at 107-16; Brief for Respondent at 14.
18. 262 S.C. 504, 205 S.E.2d 841 (1974).
19. Id. at 508, 205 S.E.2d at 843.
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to him for protection and had said so when she reported the
incident. The court said there:
The appellant had traveled one-half mile after the shooting in
order to reach the presence of this police officer and, if such
statement was made to him, it could just as well have been a
self-serving declaration made with deliberate design, and there-
fore does not come within the res gestae rule."
The element fatal to the defendants' appeals was the elapsed
time between the incident and the making of the utterances. The
extended interval negated the spontaneity of the situation and
thus violated one of the exception's requirements because of the
opportunity for reflective thought. Although the statements were
self-serving, this alone should not mandate their rejection. The
excerpt from Marshall v. Thomason,n which appears to indicate
that a self-serving statement must be excluded, is incorrect in
this respect. An excited utterance gains its trustworthiness from
the emotion of the moment which gives rise to it, not from the
content of the statement. As Professor Dreher said, "If the state-
ment is truly res gestae, arising solely from the excitement of the
occurrence, it should not matter whether it is favorable or unfa-
vorable to the declarant."2' A blanket rule of exclusion for any
statement determined to be self-serving could be unfair, and if
other requirements are met, the jury should be permitted to
weigh the credibility of the statement against its self-serving
characteristics.2
I. IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES
Three cases in 1974 presented the issue of the use of a prior
inconsistent statement to impeach a witness. In State v. Miller,6
the supreme court affirmed a conviction where earlier statements
were used to discredit the trial testimony of a codefendant who
21. Id. at 48-49, 56 S.E.2d at 738.
22. See note 6 supra.
23. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
24. DREHER at 78-79.
25. See McCoRMICK § 290, which discusses the self-serving aspects of spontaneous
declarations, and concludes that a careful examination is required to insure that the
declaration was made under circumstances of apparent sincerity, where the danger of
injustice to the defendant is great if the testimony is excluded. Such a situation would
exist in a homicide or assault case where the declaration of the accused is offered to prove
his peaceful intentions or fear of the victim.
26. 262 S.C. 369, 204 S.E.2d 738 (1974).
[NVol. 27
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there, in contradiction to his confession, exculpated the appel-
lant. In State v. Smith," a conviction was reversed where the trial
judge excluded evidence that the state's witness earlier had made
a threat against the life of the defendant; the death of a bystander
resulted from an altercation, wherein the defendant pleaded self-
defense. In State v. Williams,2" defendant's mother, whose testi-
mony had corroborated her son's plea of self-defense in a murder
prosecution, was impeached on the basis of matters the defense
characterized as collateral, but the action was upheld on appeal.
While a prior inconsistent statement of a witness may be
admitted as substantive evidence only in certain circumstances,29
it is universally accepted that such statements may be used to
contradict and thus to impeach a witness. Dean McCormick suc-
cinctly discussed the issue:
The theory of attack by prior inconsistent statements is not
based on the assumption that the present testimony is false and
the former statement true but rather upon the notion that talk-
ing one way on the stand and another way previously is blowing
hot and cold, and raises a doubt as to the truthfulness of both
statements.30
The South Carolina Supreme Court, in Bank of Parksville v.
Dorn,'31 indicated that "it was proper to ask him [the witness]
whether or not he had made certain statements, and, when he
denied making these statements, to contradict him, so as to affect
27. 263 S.C. 150, 208 S.E.2d 533 (1974).
28. 263 S.C. 290, 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974).
29. FaD. R. Ev. 801(d)(1) defines the conditions under which a prior statement by a
witness is not hearsay and therefore would be admissible to prove the truth of the matters
asserted therein. See MCCORMICK § 34, at 67, which indicates that while under a modem
view prior inconsistent statements should be admissible as substantive evidence, the more
traditional view holds that generally they are not. Section 251, at 601, discusses the
hearsay aspects of such substantive use at great length. The matter is also dealt with in
3A WIGMORE § 1018.
30. McCORMICK § 34, at 68. See 3A WIGMORE § 1017, at 993 (footnotes omitted,
emphasis in original), where it is stated:
The end aimed at by the present sort of impeaching evidence is. . .to show
the witness to be in general capable of making errors in his testimony. . .; for
upon perceiving that the witness has made an erroneous statement upon one
point, we are ready to infer that he is capable of making an error upon other
points ....
It has often been said that a prior self-contradiction shows "a defect either in
memory or in the honesty" of the witness.
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his credibility .. ."I' The rule was clearly set out in Sumter v.
American Surety Co., s3 where the court, citing Professor Wig-
more, said:
It follows. . . that Prior Self-Contradictions. . . are to be
employed merely as involving a repugnancy or inconsistency;
otherwise they would in truth be obnoxious to the Hearsay
Rule ...
Such testimony of inconsistent statements is admissible
only for the purpose of impeaching the credit of the witness, but
cannot be received as evidence of any fact touching the issue to
be tried. .... 1
One additional caveat must be added: if the scope of cross-
examination on prior inconsistencies encompasses "collateral"
matters, then the attorney is required to "take the answer," and
is not permitted to prove the making of the denied statement by
other witnesses .3 Dean McCormick explained the rationale for
this requirement, and provided a working definition of "collateral
matters:"
At this latter stage, of extrinsic evidence, that is, the production
of attacking witnesses, the range of impeachment by inconsist-
ent statements is sharply narrowed for obvious reasons of econ-
omy of time and attention. . . . [Tbo impeach by extrinsic
proof of prior inconsistent statements, the statements must
have as their subject (1) facts relevant to the issues in the cause,
or (2) facts which are themselves provable by extrinsic evidence
to discredit the witness. Facts showing bias or interest . . .
would fall in the second class."
In South Carolina, impeachment on collateral issues was re-
stricted in State v. Bodie,3" where it was stated:
[I]t is apparent that the point upon which it was proposed to
contradict [the witness] was wholly irrelevant and incompe-
32. Id. at 371, 120 S.E. at 72.
33. 174 S.C. 532, 178 S.E. 145 (1935).
34. Id. at 536, 178 S.E. at 147 (citation omitted). See State v. Bottoms, 260 S.C. 187,
195 S.E.2d 116 (1973); Squires v. Henderson, 208 S.C. 58, 36 S.E.2d 738 (1946).
35. McCoRMICK § 36, at 70.
36. Id. at 70-71 (footnotes omitted). See 3A WIGMORE § 1020, at 1009-10 (emphasis
in original), which proposes this test: "Could the fact, as to which the prior self-
contradiction is predicated, have been shown in evidence for any purpose independent of
the self-contradiction?"
37. 33 S.C. 117, 11 S.E. 624 (1890).
472 [Vol. 27
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tent to the issue which was being tried. . . . It is clear, there-
fore, that the proposed testimony . . . was properly ex-
cluded .... 11
This test to determine whether a question is collateral to the
issues joined was articulated in State v. Brock:39
Would the cross-examining party be entitled to prove the fact
as a part of, and as tending to establish, his case? If he would
be allowed to do so, the matter is not collateral; but, if he would
not be allowed to do so, it is collateral. Collateral matters, in
this sense, are such as afford no reasonable inference as to the
principal matter in dispute."
The rule remains valid in South Carolina.
41
In October of 1970, a loan office in North Charleston was the
scene of an armed robbery where several employees were either
shot or beaten. John Miller and Raymond Davis were arrested;
after a lineup identification, Davis confessed to the crime, mak-
ing a statement inculpating Miller, and was allowed to plead
guilty to the armed robbery charge alone. Miller's subsequent
conviction was reversed, 4- and on remand, resulted in a second
conviction on charges of armed robbery and assault with intent
to kill and sentences of 25 and 20 years to be served concurrently.
The second conviction is the topic of the present discussion.
In the first trial, Davis had repudiated the statement given
to the police insofar as it named Miller as his partner, and had
testified that Miller was not involved at all in the incident. The
basis for reversal involved the admission into evidence of a two-
page handwritten note, bearing this notation at its top: "Ray-
mond this is what you write me back [sic] (hurry) ." 4 The note
38. Id. at 129-30, 11 S.E. at 628. The rule was stated in South Carolina very early, in
Smith v. Henry, 2 Bail. 118, 127 (S.C. 1831): "The general rule is, that the answer of a
witness, to an immaterial question, cannot be contradicted to impeach his credit; but if
the question is in any way material to the issue, his answer can be contradicted."
39. State v. Brock, 130 S.C. 252, 126 S.E. 28 (1925).
40. Id. at 254-55, 126 S.E. at 29.
41. State v. Milam, 88 S.C. 127, 70 S.E. 447 (1911). See DRaFaR at 14-15, which
criticizes the strict application of this rule: "The trial judge should have the right, in his
discretion, to relax this rule when it appears that the fact testified to, no matter how
minor, was one which the witness could not have been mistaken about if his story was
true."
42. State v. Miller, 260 S.C. 1, 193 S.E.2d 802 (1972).
43. Record, on remand, at 194. The note began:
My name is Raymond L. Davis. I am confessing about that arm robbery [sic]
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followed the form of a confession that Davis had committed the
robbery with a "Robert Smith" and that Miller. had not been
involved. The note concluded: "The statement I gave them is not
true this is the real truth he don't know nothing about it [sic]
he is not guilty, so I hope they will let him go. Sign [sic] Ramond
L. Davis."" At the first trial, the State had introduced this evi-
dence to show that Davis' repudiation of his statement to the
police officers was a result of receiving this communication,
which the State inferred was sent by Miller. On the stand, Davis
first testified that he received the note from Miller, and then that
he did not know its source. Over objection for failure to connect
the document to Miller in any way, the trial judge permitted its
introduction." In reversing, the South Carolina Supreme Court
said:
The witness' original affirmative response to the solicitor's
suggestion that the note had been sent to him in jail by appel-
lant was in the nature of a conclusion, which would not have
qualified the writing .... The witness having repudiated this
conclusion and disclaimed knowledge of the source of the writ-
ing, and no other facts having been developed, the proffered
exhibit should have been excluded. Its admission, which ena-
bled the State to picture appellant as one who had suborned his
accomplice to renounce the truth from the witness stand and to
substitute a fabrication accusing an innocent person, was mani-
festly prejudicial."
At the second trial, Davis was again called as a witness for
the defense, and again named Robert Smith as his partner,4" de-
nying that Miller had been a participant.48 On cross-examination,
the State confronted Davis with his prior written statement (the
confession) for the purposes of impeaching his direct testimony
exculpating Miller. Davis admitted having signed the state-
ment,49 but claimed he had no memory of most of the events
noon. Me and my partner Robert Smith which is [sic] 5, 1O 2 inches tall, light
complexion. Him and I did commit it [sic], and I met Robert at the train
station that Wednesday. ...
Id. at 193.
44. 260 S.C. at 7, 193 S.E.2d at 804.
45. Id. at 7, 193 S.E.2d at 805.
46. Id. at 7-8, 193 S.E.2d at 805.
47. Record, on remand, at 153.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 172.
474 [Vol. 27
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described therein," replying, "I don't remember, really; I don't
remember" to the portions specifically naming Miller as being
involved.5 1 This testimony was admitted over defense counsel's
continued objections. The trial judge, however, was clearly cor-
rect in permitting the contradictory evidence to be admitted, for
impeachment only, although he should have accompaniedthat
admission by a contemporaneous appropriate limiting instruction
to the jury. Those instructions, however, were not given until
later, at the conclusion of Davis' testimony.2
The prosecution then turned to the matter of the handwrit-
ten note, and Davis again testified that he remembered nothing
about the note.53 The prosecutor read from Davis' testimony at
the first trial, where he had admitted receiving the note, and
Davis again denied any recollection of such receipt, or of giving
the note to a police officer, Frazer. 4 The foundation was then
laid, and Davis was put on notice that Frazer would take the
stand and testify that Davis had called him to the jail, given him
the note, told him that the original statement given to the police
was the truth, and that the note was not. Davis did not change
his testimony. 5 During a discussion before the bench, the solicitor
indicated, "I'm offering [the note] for the purpose to show that
he received the note, and regardless of who it came from, he
changed his testimony as a result of this note."56 He then added,
"If Your Honor is inquiring whether I can prove this defendant
sent the note, no, I can't, I can't prove who sent it to him."57 The
judge then ruled on the matter:
Well, I think it's admissible, Mr. Hopkins, [defense counsel]
to that extent, that a note was sent to him and as result of this
he subsequently changed his . . . [pause] not necessarily as a
result of this, but a note was sent and he subsequently changed
his statement and I think the jury is entitled to all the circum-
stances under which he changed his statement and then it can
draw inferences from the note as it sees advisable."
50. Id. at 172-81.
51. Id. at 177.
52. Id. at 199.
53. Id. at 182-83.
54. Id. at 185.
55. Id. at 197.
56. Id. at 192-93.
57. Id. at 194.
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The State then called Frazer, who testified substantially as
predicted by the solicitor.5 The note was published to the jury,
solely to test the credibility of the witness, Davis, and an instruc-
tion to that effect was given."° As a final precaution, these limit-
ing instructions were repeated in the judge's charge,' in accord-
ance with State v. Bottoms. 2 The appeal dealt with the manifest
prejudicial effect of this admission, but the trial judge's action
was correct. Davis had first implicated Miller in his confession;
he reinforced this evidence when, at the jail, he told Frazer that
his confession was the truth and that the note was not. When
Davis, at trial, reversed his testimony and indicated that Miller
had not been present at the crime and that he did not remember
the note or the conversation with Frazer, the State was correctly
permitted to impeach that testimony, and the supreme court
affirmed the conviction. 3
In State v. Smith,64 the defendant was found guilty of man-
slaughter and received a 10-year sentence. His appeal was based
in part on the trial judge's exclusion of testimony of a threat
allegedly made against the defendant by the State's principal
witness. The witness had denied making the threat, and the de-
fendant sought to use the evidence both as a prior inconsistent
statement to impeach, and to establish hostile feelings between
the parties. The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed, and re-
versed and remanded the case.65
Smith began dating Gordon's ex-wife after their divorce, and
the two did not have a friendly relationship."6 On the day of the
59. Id. at 228-30.
60. Id. at 231.
61. Id. at 251.
62. 260 S.C. 187, 195 S.E.2d 116 (1973). The court laid down this rule:
Even where the making of the inconsistent statement is denied and it is appro-
priate to introduce such for the purpose of impeachment, it is the duty of the
court, upon request, to instruct the jury that it can consider such evidence for
the purpose of impeachment only, not as substantive evidence of the facts.
Id. at 194, 195 S.E.2d at 118 (citation omitted).
63. 262 S.C. at 373, 204 S.E.2d at 732.
64. 263 S.C. 150, 208 S.E.2d 533 (1974).
65. Id. at 155, 208 S.E.2d at 535.
66. This hostility is shown in some of the testimony the solicitor elicited from Smith:
Q. Now, Mr. Smith, it would be a fair statement to say that there was certainly
no love lost between you and Buddy Gordon.
A. Yes.
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incident, Mrs. Gordon had telephoned Smith and asked him to
come to her house to discuss some vulgar statements Gordon had
claimed Smith had made about her. En route in his automobile,
Smith passed a grocery store and heard a shout; seeing a friend,
he stopped and began to back up. According to his testimony, two
gunshots then hit his car; getting a pistol from the glove box, he
shot back at his assailant, whom he recognized as Gordon. The
friend was killed by a stray shot, and Smith turned himself in to
the police.
At the trial, it was established conclusively that a bullet from
Smith's weapon caused the homicide. Gordon testified that
Smith began the firing, and that his shots were taken in self-
defense. 7 On cross-examination, Gordon denied threatening
Smith; when asked specifically if he had made an uncommuni-
cated threat at a particular time and place, he again denied it,
and further denied making any other threats." The defense then
presented a third party, and after placing him at the previously
mentioned time and place, sought to introduce the evidence in
issue. The record relates what ensued:
Q. Did he [Gordon] at that time make a treat [sic] in
your presence on the life of ike [sic] Smith?
A. Yes, sir.
Solicitor Green:
We will object to it, may it please the Court, unless it is
established that it was communicated.
The Court:
I sustain the objection.
Mr. Lynn [defense counsel]:
Q. Was anyone else present?
The Court:
I sustained the objection.
Mr. Lynn:
Can I ask him...
The Court:
You can't go into threats unless you lay the proper founda-
tion.
Q. In fact you hated him didn't you?
A. I didn't hate him. I didn't like him a whole lot.
Record addendum at 13.
67. 263 S.C. at 154, 208 S.E.2d at 534.
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Mr. Lynn:
Your Honor, I'm doing this to impeach the statement I
asked Mr. Gordon earlier. I asked Mr. Gordon on the stand
whether or not he made this statement.
Solicitor Greene:
We object to it unless the proper foundation is laid.
The Court:
And I sustain it."'
On appeal, Smith maintained that this testimony concerning
the alleged threat should have been admitted to show that Gor-
don was the probable aggressor in the shooting between the two
and to show the relationship between the parties. The threat
could also impeach Gordon's credibility both as a prior inconsist-
ent statement and by showing Gordon's bias against Smith. 0 The
State argued that the threat, made six months earlier, was too
remote to be admitted, and that since the relationship and ag-
gressor arguments were not advanced before the judge at the time
of the objection, they could not be raised now on appeal." The
State further viewed the evidence as inadmissible to show bias
because the testimony would merely be cumulative to testimony
already given concerning their relationship,72 and again, that the
grounds for this admission were not made below.73 The State then
argued that even if the judge had inadvertently and incorrectly
excluded the threat for impeachment, because it was uncommun-
icated, it was defense counsel's "duty to place before the Trial
Court the proper basis of admissibility." 4 Finally, the State sug-
gested that the alleged threat was a collateral matter and thus
could not be used to contradict the witness, maintaining that "it
69. Id. at 7-8.
70. Id. at 11-12.
71. Brief for Respondent at 4-5.
72. Id. at 7; see note 66 supra.
73. Brief for Respondent at 7.
74. Id. at 8. The State asserted:
In the instant case, the Trial Judge, according to Appellant, made it clear that
he was ruling the threat inadmissible because it had not been communicated.
Tjhis, of course, had no bearing on its admissibility for impeachment purposes.
It was incumbent upon Appellant to point out to the Trial Judge his error in
excluding the testimony. Having failed to do so, he is foreclosed from raising it
here.
Id. at 9. This argument is ludicrous, because it is obvious from the testimony and the
record that defense counsel made it clear that the purpose of the introduction of the
evidence was impeachment, and after the State again objected for lack of foundation, the
judge again cut defense counsel off. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
[Vol. 27
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is clear that the Trial Judge was clearly acting within his discre-
tion in finding that these threats were collateral and could not be
used for impeachment. 7 5 This theory also appears spurious as it
is apparent that the trial judge never actually considered the
issue of the threat as a collateral matter.76
The supreme court held that a threat made six months
prior was not too remote, relying on State v. Brooks,7" where a
threat made eight months before a homicide was held "properly
admitted under the well-settled rule admitting evidence of pre-
vious quarrels, ill-feeling, or hostile acts between the parties to
show the animus probably existing between them at the time of
the homicide."" The remoteness issue having been decided in
the defendant's favor, evidence of Gordon's threat was then
found
admissible for impeachment purposes as a prior inconsistent
statement of the witness .... The foundation for the use of
this threat was properly laid through the cross-examination of
the State's witness and the Appellant clearly stated the purpose
for which the testimony was introduced.7
Finally, the court correctly concluded that the issue was not col-
lateral,' as it dealt directly with the issues involved.
In State v. Williams,"1 the defendant was convicted of volun-
tary manslaughter and received a 15-year sentence. One of the
bases for his appeal was the impeachment of a defense witness,
his mother, on a collateral issue.
The defendant, Bobby Williams, testified that after an argu-
ment with the deceased concerning his girlfriend, he had gone to
his room to get two wallets containing some money left there. He
did not find the wallets, but a pistol he had left with them was
there. His mother, his brother, and the deceased, Phoebe May-
bank, all denied having taken the money. 2 An argument followed
75. Brief for Respondent at 10.
76. See Reply Brief for Appellant at 10, where it is stated: "No question as to the
collateral nature of the threat was raised nor did the Court mention the question of
whether the threat was collateral. It is obvious that the Court did not find the threat to
be collateral and did not exclude it on that ground."
77. 79 S.C. 144, 60 S.E. 518 (1908).
78. Id. at 146, 60 S.E. at 518.
79. 263 S.C. at 153, 208 S.E.2d at 534.
80. Id. at 155, 208 S.E.2d at 534-35. The court cited State v. Brock, 130 S.C. 252,
126 S.E. 28 (1925), to support this conclusion. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
81. 263 S.C. 290, 210 S.E.2d 298 (1974).
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between the defendant and the deceased. The defendant testified
at trial that he exhibited the pistol and explained that one of
them must have the money because a thief would have taken the
weapon as well." He also declared that Maybank threatened him
with a butcher knife, and that he shot her in self-defense. 4 Defen-
dant's brother contradicted this, saying that the deceased, his
common-law wife, had had no weapon and was not advancing
towards the defendant when she was shot. 5
Defendant's mother, Essie Williams, testified in corrobora-
tion of her son's version of the incident." On cross-examination
she denied that she had hidden the wallets.87 When asked if she
hadn't told a neighbor, Barbara White, "that if she had given
Robert his money this shooting would never have taken place," 8
she denied making the statement;' and the solicitor put her on
notice that he would call the neighbor to contradict her. Mrs.
White was later produced, and over objection as an attempt to
impeach on a collateral matter, she testified:
She [Mrs. Williams] said that Phoebe had made up the bed
and that she had found Bobby's wallet and she brought the
wallet and gave it to Mrs. Essie and Mrs. Essie said she heard
them arguing at the time and that if she only had given him his
pocketbook that wouldn't have happened because she showed us
the wallet with the money in it .... 1
On appeal, Williams maintained that since his mother's tes-
timony was crucial to his self-defense argument, the impeach-
ment on a collateral matter was highly prejudicial and required
reversal.2 This appeal indicated that one of the key issues regard-
ing this testimony was
whether the defendant had acted in self-defense in shooting the
deceased. What Mrs. Williams said to her neighbors about the
83. Id. at 141.
84. Id. at 142.
85. Id. at 33.
86. Mrs. Williams declared, "He had a gun and Phoebe had this butcher knife here
and she was hitting, knocing [sic] at him with the knife like that and she said shoot,
shoot and I'll cut you up with this knife." Id. at 120.
87. Id. at 126.
88. Id. at 127.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 128.
91. Id. at 166.
92. Brief for Appellant at 11.
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money in dispute was totally irrelevant to any of these issues,
to which the State's evidence might properly be addressed..
Therefore, the evidence impeaching Mrs. Williams on this
point tended to distract the jury from the real issues, and may
have impeached her credibility in the minds of the jurors upon
an improper basis. 3
The State replied that the matter was not collateral, and
that even if it was, the trial court acted within its discretion in
allowing impeachment. The State asserted that if Mrs. Williams
not only had the wallets, but had told her son that she had them,
then he would have had no reason to confront the deceased with
the gun other than that he was still angry at her from their pre-
vious argument, and he planned to threaten her. If this could be
shown, it would seriously weaken the defendant's case of self-
defense.94
The State offered another argument for the position that the
court acted within its discretion in allowing the impeachment.
Relying on Dean McCormick's exception for facts showing bias or
intent,95 the State proposed:
If, as the Appellant testified, she told him that she did not have
the wallets, then this untruth on her part was the cause of the
trouble between her son and Miss Maybank, which culminated
in the latter's death. Any mother, of course, would have an
interest in seeing her son acquitted. However, in the instant
case, Mrs. Williams must have had more than the usual amount
of interest because of her feeling of guilt in indirectly bringing
about her son's difficulties. The state had a right to establish




The State then concluded that "given the fact that the missing
wallets, allegedly, were the cause of the fatal altercation, there
can be no doubt that Mrs. Williams could not have been mis-
taken about their true location if the rest of her story were true."97
In affirming the conviction, the supreme court first noted
that the problems presented in the application of the prior incon-
sistent statement exception to the hearsay rule center around
93. Id. at 13.
94. Brief for Respondent at 13.
95. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
96. Brief for Respondent at 14.
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clarifying the definition of collateral matters. The court noted
"that considerable latitude and discretion should be allowed the
trial judge in determining the admissibility of impeaching testi-
mony.""8 After discussing the arguments presented by the State,
the court concluded:
The circumstances indicate significant probabilities that misre-
presentation in the mother's statements concerning the wallets
may have operated on her other testimony and materially af-
fected its trustworthiness.
Under the foregoing facts and circumstances, we cannot
hold that the trial judge abused his discretion in permitting the
impeachment of the witness as to her alleged self-contradicting
statement. 99
III. JUDICIAL COMMENTS
A trial judge has the right, originating in the common law,' 0
to interrogate a witness to clarify testimony or to bring to light
facts necessary for the proper resolution of the issue, particularly
when these facts are not introduced by the parties themselves."°'
Inherent in this right is the concurrent obligation to question in
98. 263 S.C. at 302, 210 S.E.2d at 304.
99. Id. at 303, 210 S.E.2d at 304-05.
100. Professor Wigmore noted:
The sporting theory of the common law. . . in which litigation was a game
of skill, to be conducted according to specific rules and to be decided by the
combined effects of skill, strength, and luck, tended to place the judge primarily
in the position of the umpire of a game, whose duty it was to interfere only so
far as needed to decide whether the rules of the game had been violated. But
this tendency never dominated (so far as the judge's functions were concerned)
in the orthodox English practice; the judge there has never ceased to perform
an active and virile part as a director of the proceedings and as an administrator
of justice.
Nevertheless, in the United States the degenerate tendency has steadily
been to relegate the judge to the position of merely umpire presiding over con-
testants in a game. Not only has public opinion pressed towards this end, but
the judiciary as a whole has often not resisted, but rather abdicated. Several
reasons. . . have contributed to this; chief among the illustrations of the tend-
ency is, perhaps, the ill-advised yet almost universal legislative prohibition
against comments by the judge upon the evidence in his charge to the jury.
3 WIGMORE § 784, at 188-89 (footnotes, citations omitted).
101. McCoR~McK § 8, at 12. FED. R. Ev. 614(b) states: "The court may interrogate
witnesses whether called by itself or by a party." The Advisory Committee's note to
proposed rule 614(b) added: "The authority is, of course, abused when the judge abandons
his proper role and assumes that of advocate. . . ." 56 F.R.D. 183, 280 (1973).
16
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss3/3
EVIDENCE
a guarded manner, lest the judge imply an opinion as to the
veracity of the witness:
Thus, if the judge uses leading questions, suggesting the desired
answer, the questions may strongly imply that the desired
answer is the truth. . . .[Qluestions which are aimed at dis-
crediting or impeaching the witness, though allowable for coun-
sel, when asked by the judge may often - not always - inti-
mate the judge's belief that the witness has been lying, and thus
be an implied comment on the weight of his testimony.'
The judge must carefully avoid assuming the role of advocate, or
"he faces the risk that the appellate court will find that he has
crossed the line between judging and advocacy.'
'10 3
The South Carolina rule was set out in 1910 in State v.
Anderson"4 where an appellant claimed the circuit judge had
erred in not leaving the examination of the witnesses wholly to
the attorneys. The court answered:
A grave responsibility rests upon a trial judge. It is his duty to
see to it that justice be done in every case, if it can be done
according to law; and if he thinks that the attorney for either
party, either from inadvertence or any other cause, has failed to
ask the witnesses the questions necessary and proper to bring
out all the testimony which tends to ascertain the truth of the
matter under investigation, we can see no legal objection to his
propounding such questions; but, of course, he should do so in
a fair and impartial manner, and should not by the form or
manner of his questions, express or indicate to the jury his opin-
ion as to the facts of the case, or as to the weight or sufficiency
of the evidence.0 5
The court has discretion in determining whether to interro-
gate a witness, and generally the judge is given wide latitude in
his actions.
[This discretion will not be controlled except where it appears
that the manner in which the judge exercised his right tended
unduly to impress the jury with the importance of the testimony
102. MCCORMICK § 8, at 12-13 (footnotes omitted).
103. Id. § 8, at 13. McCormick notes several instances when convictions were set aside
where the judge asked an inordinate number of questions, implied incredulity by the
manner of his questions, or became a partisan. Id. § 8, at 13 n.37.
104. 85 S.C. 229, 67 S.E. 237 (1910).
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elicited, or would be likely to lead the jury to suppose that the
judge was of the opinion that one party rather than the other
should prevail in the case. '
There is further indication that the judge should refrain from
such questioning except in certain limited situations:
In view of the well-known fact of the great influence of the
presiding judge upon the minds of a jury, who are quick to seize
upon any intimation by word or gesture from him, it is better
to leave the examination of witnesses to those charged with that
duty, in the absence of a plain omission to elicit evidence for or
against a defendant."'7
In State v. Robinson,"' the defendant was convicted of mur-
der and burglary and was sentenced to life imprisonment. His
appeal was based in part upon the judge's interruption of the
cross-examination of one of the state's witnesses; in the course of
the exchange between the two, the judge expressed an odious,
derogatory opinion of the defendant in the presence of the jury.
Counsel's immediate motion for a mistrial was overruled, but the
South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction.
The alleged murder took place at the house of Shirley, a
woman with whom Robinson had lived for about three years.
They had separated some six weeks prior to the shooting.' 0
On cross-examination, Shirley admitted she was a prosti-
tute."0 While she was being questioned about how much money
she had contributed to the living expenses they incurred when she
and Robinson had lived together, the judge interrupted:
THE COURT: How much money did you give him all
together?
A. Concerning a week, Your Honor-
THE COURT: I mean the whole time you were there.
106. State v. Furtick, 147 S.C. 82, 84, 144 S.E. 839, 840 (1928), quoting Hart v. State,
14 Ga. App. 364, 80 S.E. 909 (1914).
107. 147 S.C. at 85, 144 S.E. at 840. See State v. Vickers, 226 S.C. 301, 84 S.E.2d
873 (1954); State v. Martin, 216 S.C. 129, 132, 57 S.E.2d 55, 56 (1949) ("It is usually better
for the trial Judge to refrain from cross-examining witnesses and, always, from making
any remark which may affect the weight to be given the testimony of a witness by the
jury.").
108. 262 S.C. 193, 203 S.E.2d 433 (1974).
109. Id. at 196, 203 S.E.2d at 433-34.
110. Record at 148.
[Vol. 27
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A. I couldn't add it up, it was so much.
THE COURT: How much would you make as a prostitute?
Say a night?
A. A night - something like $200 a night.
THE COURT: He was just a pimp living off of your in-
come, and other people's income, is that right?"'
Immediately after this exchange, defense counsel moved for a
mistrial, and the judge tried to justify his remarks:
MR. GLEASON [defense counsel]: May it please the Court,
the defense would at this time make a motion for a mistrial on
the grounds of the remarks interjected in front of the jury by the
Court, to the effect that the defendant on trial here is nothing
more than a pimp living off the earnings of this witness. I think
that this is so prejudicial that it will amount to a verdict of
guilty in this case.
THE COURT: He's not being tried for being a pimp, he's
being tried for murder.
MR. GLEASON: Nevertheless, those remarks, I feel, would only
tend to prejudice the jury against this defendant in arriving at
a verdict, Your Honor.
THE COURT: The record will preserve your objection. I'm
not going to comment on it any further - but you asked
the original question as to how she made a living, and she
said she was a prostitute. Then you asked her about what
she made and how much did she give him, and she said
half of it. You asked her was that in a week, and I was just
clarifying the fact that she was talking about the entire
time, and you were attempting to limit it to a week. The
door was opened by you on cross-examination. The motion
is overruled.'
It is obvious that the judge's odious comment did nothing to
clarify the answer being given to counsel's questions.
The supreme court correctly reversed on the basis of these
remarks, characterizing them as "entirely uncalled for and pat-
ently so erroneous and prejudicial as to require little discussion
or citation of authority."'13 Robinson had not put his character in
issue, and the record showed that he had been employed for over
111. Id. at 149.
112. Id. at 150-51.
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three years in a position of responsibility. The judge's remarks,
the court noted,
imputed to the appellant the commission of a crime other than
than that for which he was being tried and such comment was
in violation of. . .Article 5, Section 17 of the South Carolina
Constitution, which provides that "Judges shall not charge ju-
ries in respect to matters of fact, but shall declare the law."'
14
IV. SIMILAR HAPPENINGS
An elementary rule in presenting evidence of a similar hap-
pening is that the circumstances of both events must be substan-
tially identical. Professor Dreher has indicated the value of such
evidence: "The description in court of an out-of-court simulation
of the actual occurrence which gave rise to the litigation in order
to demonstrate cause or effect can be a very effective trial tech-
nique.""' Failure to adhere to this precept resulted in the affirma-
tion of the trial court's ruling in Hankins v. Foye."6
In determining the admissibility of such evidence, its proba-
tive value is balanced against the possible hazard of misleading
the jury. Dean McCormick cautions against having the jury give
disproportionate weight to the results of experiments: "Usually
the best gauge of the probative value of experiments is the extent
to which the conditions of the experiment were identical with or
similar to those obtaining in respect to the litigated happen-
ing. " 7 The requirement of similarity is relative; so long as it may
be concluded that the results of an experiment are of substantial
value, the evidence should be admitted."'
The leading case on the subject in South Carolina is the 1962
decision of McDowell v. Floyd.' There, plaintiff's automobile
was stopped at night without lights, facing east on a two-lane
road. Plaintiff was out of her car talking to the driver of a truck
which was stopped alongside her car in the other lane, facing
west, with its headlights burning. Defendant's automobile
rounded a curve and struck plaintiffs vehicle, which then struck
her. The defense was based on the inability to see the stopped
114. Id. at 198, 203 S.E.2d at 434.
115. DREHER at 42.
116. 263 S.C. 310, 210 S.E.2d 305 (1974).
117. MCCORMICK § 202, at 485.
118. Id. § 202, at 486.
119. 240 S.C. 158, 125 S.E.2d 4 (1962).
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vehicle due to plaintiff's negligence in having her lights turned
off. At the trial, plaintiff's counsel was successful in his attempt
to enter evidence of an experiment; his witness testified that he
had parked a car at the same place in the road, extinguished its
lights, and then drove around the curve in another car, marking
the place at which he was first able to observe the parked car.
This distance was then measured. On cross-examination defense
counsel elicited an admission that at the time of the experiment,
there was no second vehicle parked with its lights facing the
curve, corresponding to the position and condition of the truck.
A motion to strike due to these different circumstances was de-
nied. On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed,
stating:
It can hardly be reasonably contended that the conditions which
confronted Appellant Floyd as he approached the bright lights
of the pickup truck were substantially similar to the conditions
with which he would have been confronted had there been no
bright lights facing him.'
Hankins involved an automobile accident as well. The plain-
tiff, travelling south on Highway 301 in Allendale, was struck
while turning left by defendant's northbound car. Plaintiff testi-
fied that she looked for oncoming traffic in both directions "be-
fore and as she proceeded to turn left . . . and saw none." ' In
addition, she testified that there was a dip in the road beyond the
intersection such that an approaching vehicle would disappear for
a short period. This fact was critical to her position.
Two witnesses testified in her behalf. The first witness was
asked, "Have you experienced any visibility difficulties as far as
oncoming traffic is concerned?""12 An objection to this was sus-
tained, and the witness excused. A second individual, a highway
engineer, testified that
he had experienced difficulty in seeing automobiles approaching
the intersection from the south. He was not familiar with the
type vehicles involved in this collision and did not testify as an
expert, but testified from his previous general observation in
driving through the intersection. 1'
120. Id. at 164, 125 S.E.2d at 7.
121. 263 S.C. at 312, 210 S.E.2d at 306.
122. Id.
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The other answers of the witness established that his testimony
was merely opinion based on personal observations. For this rea-
son the trial court struck the testimony.
The trial judge is vested with discretion in determining the
relevance of such evidence, and the supreme court found no abuse
of this discretion had taken place. The trial judge was said to
have correctly excluded the testimony "because of the failure to
show that the observations of the witnesses at other times were
made under similar conditions to those under inquiry." ' 4
The court properly indicated that the relevance of this testi-
mony was to show that plaintiff could not have seen defendant's
oncoming vehicle as she turned, because it was out of view in the
roadway depression. Contending that without evidence of the
precise location of this dip, one could not determine (from this
testimony) the length of time an approaching car would be visible
after emerging from the dip before reaching the intersection, the
court concluded:
Simply to show that a car would disappear from view in a de-
pression within 300 feet of an intersection, without showing at
what point it would reappear into view, would be of doubtful aid
to the jury in deciding whether plaintiff should have seen defen-
dant's vehicle when she started to make the turn.
The absence of a more precise location of the depression
with reference to the intersection and the failure to show the
facts and circumstances surrounding the observations of the
witnesses at another time sustain the discretionary exclusion of
the proferred testimony.' 5
It is unfortunate that plaintiffs attorney did not take more
care in preparing for trial. If, indeed, the road topography was the
cause of plaintiff's failure to see the other automobile, counsel
should have performed a simple experiment under substantially
similar conditions. It should not have been difficult to make such
a test with a car of similar model and color, under lighting condi-
tions approximating those at the time of the incident. Such evi-
dence, coupled with precise measurements enabling valid conclu-
sions to be drawn as to the time an oncoming car would have been
visible, would no doubt have been admissible under the universal
rule; it certainly would have been of assistance to the jury. The
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outcome might have been different. Under the facts of the case,
however, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided correctly.
V. EXPERT WITNESS
In State v. Pierce,' the defendant was found guilty of mur-
der and received a sentence of life imprisonment which he ap-
pealed. The trial court refused to allow a hypnotist to testify to
the results of an examination relating to defendant's whereabouts
on certain dates, and to his guilt or innocence. The South Caro-
lina Supreme Court affirmed the conviction relying on the gener-
ally accepted rule that the results of an hypnotic examination are
not admissible if offered for the truth of the matters asserted. 127
The basis for exclusion of this kind of testimony is that as a form
of hearsay it lacks reliability. The issue appears to be of first
impression in South Carolina.
The homicide purportedly occurred December 18, 1970. The
State's principal evidence was an alleged confession, made in
Georgia in the presence of several South Carolina officers on April
29, 1971, in which the defendant allegedly admitted that he had
been in Sumter, the location of the murder, and that he had
committed the act.128 Pierce maintained at trial that this "confes-
sion" had been coerced, and he presented several witnesses who
testified that he had been in Swainsboro, Georgia, at the time of
the homicide. 12 Thus, the testimony of the hypnotist was critical
to his defense, insofar as it corroborated these witnesses.
Testimony admitted at the trial by both the hypnotist, whose
qualifications were well-established, and the psychiatrist of the
Central Correctional Institute, who was present at the session,
indicated that Pierce was a "good hypnotic subject."' 3 The syn-
opsis of proferred testimony of the hypnotist, as submitted to the
supreme court on appeal, revealed that Pierce, during the exami-
nation, had "relived" the events of the time period encompassing
the date of the crime:
[H]e accounted for his activities on December 8 through De-
cember 23. Briefly, these regressions revealed no criminal activ-
126. 263 S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
127. MCCORMICK § 208, at 507-10.
128. 263 S.C. 23, 27, 207 S.E.2d 414, 416.
129. Record Part II at 184-202, 216-31.
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ity and that Pierce was not in Sumter at any time during this
period.''
In addition, these questions and their responses would have dealt
with the ultimate issue in the case:
Q. Did you ask Mr. Pierce if he killed Miss Cuttino?
A. Yes. His reply was "no".
Q. Was his finger response [a method used to insure truth-
telling] consistent with his verbal response on this particular
question?
A. As on all other occasions, his finger response indicated that
he was telling the truth.'32
On appeal, defendant cited Professor Wigmore's commen-
tary on the general use of scientific experimental tests by psychol-
ogists in support of admissibility:
All that should be required as a condition is the preliminary
testimony of a scientist that the proposed test is an accepted one
in his profession and that it has a reasonable measure of preci-
sion in its indications.'
Appellant, however, carefully omitted Wigmore's specific rejec-
tion of any hypnotic evidence:
Hypnotic sleep has by some scientists been said to be a
condition in which the subject will make truthful answers to
questions. But this method has not yet been adequately tested
for judicial purposes. . . . [The hypnotizer may use his power
to falsify the subject's narration, and therefore the method has
dangers of its own. 34
The appellant further observed that the South Carolina Law En-
forcement Division uses hypnosis in its investigations'35 and that
the same hypnotist was used to clear another suspect in the
Pierce case. The defendant thus argued that this testimony
should be admitted.' This contention failed to consider that law
enforcement authorities employ a wide variety of testing devices
in their investigative work, yet many of these devices are not
131. Record Part I at 171.
132. Id. at 181-91.
133. 3A WIGMORE§ 990, at 922; Brief for Appellant at 6.
134. 3A WIGMOaz § 998, at 943 (footnote omitted, emphasis in original).
135. Record Part I at 154-55.
136. Brief for Appellant at 8.
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adequate to determine the ultimate issue, or to replace trial by
jury.
137
While some jurisdictions have permitted limited use of hyp-
notic testimony,' 3 Dean McCormick best summarizes the current
posture of the issue as follows:
Declarations made under hypnosis have been treated judi-
cially in a manner similar to drug-induced statements. The hyp-
notized person is ultrasuggestible, and this manifestation en-
dangers the reliability of his statements. The courts have recog-
nized to some extent the usefulness of hypnosis, as an investiga-
tive technique. . . . However, they have rejected . . . state-
ments made under hypnosis when offered by the subject in his
own behalf .... "I
In light of the current state of the art of hypnotism, the Pierce
decision seems to rest on firm ground.
137. Brief for Respondent at 8; McCoRMICK § 208, at 510 n.27.
138. MCCORMICK § 208, at 510 n.28; 3A WIGMORE § 998, at 943 n.5.
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